455th vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report - F16CM 96-104

[POSOHM]

455 vAIR EXPEDITIONARY WING​

vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report​

Mishap Aircraft (MA): F-16CM, S/N 96-104
Unit: 8th vFS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: MUSKET 1 flight (4-ship); MA was MUSKET 12
Mishap Date: 25 Jul 2026
Mishap Time: 11:24:04 (Tacview mission clock)
Airspace: Nevada Test and Training Range; ECW complex
Mission: Non-formal night/NVD tactical surface-attack training
Crew: Student Pilot (SP); no ejection recorded
Other Aircraft: MUSKET 11, MUSKET 13, and MUSKET 14 (non-mishap)
Damage: Aircraft destroyed

1. Authority and Purpose​

This vAIB short form is organized consistent with USAF practice under AFI 51-307 and the format exemplified in public F-16 AIBs (Authority/Purpose; Sequence of Events; Maintenance; Systems; Weather; Crew Qualifications; Medical; Operations and Supervision; Human Factors; Governing Directives; Statement of Opinion). The purpose of this report is for entertainment and learning only in DCS.

Findings are based on the preponderance of the evidence available to the Board. The evidence reviewed consisted of Tacview telemetry, the mission route card, the SP’s statement, and the SP’s post-sortie currency record. No cockpit video, DCS track file, radio recording, formal mission brief, maintenance forms, or detailed weather/illumination package was provided.

2. Accident Summary​

MUSKET 1 was planned as a four-ship night tactical surface-attack flight. Following a connection interruption and troubleshooting, the MA entered the mission at Nellis while the other three flight members were already airborne approximately 64–67 NM north. The MA departed alone and proceeded toward the tactical route. It did not rejoin the formation; telemetry shows the MA remained at least 25.6 NM from every other F-16 through impact.

During the terminal attack sequence, the SP did not obtain sensor contact on the assigned desired mean point of impact (DMPI) and described the situation as “tumbleweed.” The SP was unsure whether the NVDs were preventing an effective view of the targeting-pod display and removed the NVDs. The SP then experienced an SA-6 engagement and attempted to defend while already engaged in a rapidly steepening, nose-low maneuver.

The MA began its terminal descent at approximately 11:23:39, about 24.6 seconds before impact and approximately 18 seconds before the first recorded SA-6 missile launch. At the first launch, the MA was already approximately 29.7 degrees nose-low, descending at about 30,800 feet per minute, and only about 3,500 feet above the target-area elevation. Neither SA-6 missile struck the MA. The MA continued descending without an effective recovery and impacted terrain at 11:24:04, approximately 0.13 NM from listed DMPI J7547X5. No ejection was recorded.

3. Background​

Unit/Aircraft. F-16CM assigned to 8th vFS, 455th vAEW.

Sortie type. Non-formal night/NVD tactical surface-attack training incorporating low-altitude navigation, a pop-up/terminal attack, and operations in a surface-to-air threat environment.

Planned route. FLEX – DREAM – CRYSTAL SPRING – TQQ106022 – QUARTZITE MT [IP] – T75.47 [TGT] – EXIT – EC SOUTH – FLUSH – INS256017 – STRYK – JORDN – GASSPEAK – APEX – PHINN – KLSV.21R. Planned route groundspeed was 480 knots. The route card listed DMPIs J7547X5, J7547X22, J7547X26, and J7547X28 in the target area.

Time convention. All sequence times below use the Tacview mission clock. The route card displayed a seven-hour offset; therefore, the 11:24:04 telemetry impact time corresponds to the route card’s planned 18:24:04 target time.

4. Sequence of Events​

a. Mission​

MUSKET 1 was a four-ship night tactical surface-attack flight. The MA occupied the -2 position. The profile included NVD use, low-altitude ingress tasks, targeting-pod employment against a DMPI, and operations against a live simulated SA-6 threat.

b. Planning​

The flight was non-formal rather than a formal syllabus event. The DP had not received the Night Phase Briefing and had not completed the NTR event. The SP also had no recorded NVD Low Altitude Training (LOWAT) event and was overdue for Low Altitude A/G currency by 94 days.

The route card planned T75.47 [TGT] for 18:24:04. Telemetry shows the MA arrived in the target area at the corresponding mission-clock time of 11:24:04. During the latter portion of the ingress, the MA flew approximately 550–595 knots groundspeed against a planned 480 knots.

c. Preflight, Connection Interruption, and Separation​

At 10:54:44, the other three F-16s were already airborne. At 10:55:23, the MA appeared on the Nellis ramp following the reported connection interruption and troubleshooting. The other flight members were then approximately 64–67 NM away.

The MA lifted off at approximately 11:05:25 and proceeded alone. No effective rejoin occurred. The closest recorded separation between the MA and any other F-16 was approximately 25.6 NM, immediately before impact. Consequently, the MA conducted the tactical ingress and terminal attack without normal visual mutual support, formation cross-monitoring, or immediate flight-lead intervention.

d. Summary of Accident​

• 11:16:19: The MA passed within approximately 0.53 NM of CRYSTAL SPRING at about 5,555 feet MSL, approximately 1,733 feet above the route-point elevation.
• 11:21:55: The MA passed approximately 2.33 NM from TQQ106022 at about 7,143 feet MSL, approximately 1,205 feet above the route-point elevation.
• 11:22:14: The MA passed within approximately 0.61 NM of QUARTZITE MT [IP] at about 13,393 feet MSL following a climb/pop-up from the low-altitude ingress.
• Prior to terminal maneuvering (SP statement): The SP did not obtain targeting-pod contact on the DMPI, assessed the situation as tumbleweed, questioned whether the NVDs were interfering with display visibility, and removed the NVDs.
• 11:23:39: At approximately 13,600 feet MSL and 3.14 NM from the route target, the MA rolled beyond 80 degrees of bank and entered a sustained descent. The terminal descent therefore began approximately 18 seconds before the first recorded SA-6 missile launch.
• 11:23:51: The descent rate exceeded approximately 30,000 feet per minute. The MA was about 11,500 feet MSL and approximately 1.8 NM from the route target.
• 11:23:57.51: The southern SA-6 battery launched the first 3M9 missile. The MA was approximately 8,782 feet MSL, about 3,500 feet above target-area elevation, approximately 29.7 degrees nose-low, in about 62 degrees of left bank, and descending at approximately 30,800 feet per minute. The missile was approximately 13.2 NM from the MA at launch and never approached closer than approximately 11.5 NM.
• 11:24:01.63: The battery launched a second 3M9 missile. The MA was approximately 6,500 feet MSL, about 1,200 feet above target-area elevation, still approximately 31 degrees nose-low, and less than 2.5 seconds from impact. The missile remained more than 12 NM from the MA.
• 11:24:03.87: Final MA telemetry recorded approximately 5,308 feet MSL, 480 knots groundspeed, 31.6 degrees nose-low, 82.2 degrees of right bank, and a descent rate of approximately 31,300 feet per minute. No sustained pull-up or arresting trend was evident.
• 11:24:04.07: MA telemetry terminated at terrain impact near N 37°25.491′, W 116°40.041′. The impact point was approximately 0.13 NM from listed DMPI J7547X5 and approximately 0.58 NM from the T75.47 route point. No weapon release by the MA was recorded.

e. Impact​

The MA struck rising target-area terrain while in controlled, steep nose-low flight. The final recorded altitude was approximately 26 feet above the listed elevation of J7547X5.

f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment​

No ejection event was recorded before impact. The SP reported difficulty integrating NVD use with targeting-pod display interpretation, but the evidence did not establish a malfunction of the NVDs, targeting pod, or aircraft displays. The reported difficulty is more consistent with task unfamiliarity and NVD employment technique than equipment failure.

g. Search and Rescue​

Not applicable; no ejection was recorded.

5. Maintenance​

No aircraft forms, inspection records, or maintenance discrepancies were provided to the Board. Tacview showed no missile impact, breakup, or loss of aircraft control attributable to a system failure before terrain impact. No evidence supports maintenance, engine, hydraulic, electrical, flight-control, targeting-pod, or NVD malfunction as a causal factor.

6. Airframe and Systems​

(1) CSFDR/Telemetry​

Telemetry establishes:

• The MA operated independently throughout the sortie and never came within 25.6 NM of another flight member.
• The terminal descent began approximately 24.6 seconds before impact and approximately 18 seconds before the first recorded SA-6 launch.
• The MA descended from approximately 13,600 feet MSL to terrain in less than 25 seconds.
• At the first launch, the MA was already in an approximately 30-degree dive at more than 30,000 feet per minute.
• Neither SA-6 missile struck or closely approached the MA.
• Final impact occurred at 11:24:04 near J7547X5 without ejection.

(2) Threat Engagement​

The SA-6 launch was a genuine and significant workload event, but it was not a direct shootdown and did not initiate the terminal descent. The first missile launched only 6.6 seconds before impact, after the MA had already entered an unrecovered nose-low trajectory. The launch and defensive response substantially increased task demand and further reduced the SP’s remaining capacity to recognize and arrest the descent.

(3) Targeting Pod and NVDs​

The SP reported no sensor contact on the DMPI and uncertainty about viewing the targeting-pod display while using NVDs. No telemetry or cockpit recording established a targeting-pod or NVD failure. Removing the NVDs during the terminal attack changed the SP’s visual environment at the same time the SP was attempting target acquisition, flying a pop-up/roll-in, and responding to a SAM threat.

(4) Ground-Collision Advisories​

No cockpit recording was available to determine ALOW, MSL-floor, CARA, GAAF, or other collision-warning settings and indications. The Board therefore makes no finding that a warning system failed or that a specific warning was disregarded.

7. Weather​

The sortie was conducted at night and required NVD use. Detailed weather, visibility, moon angle, and illumination data were not provided. No evidence indicates that weather caused the mishap. The reduced external visual cues inherent to night operations increased dependence on correct NVD employment and a disciplined flight-instrument, altitude, and terrain cross-check.

8. Crew Qualifications​

The SP was an F-16 Squadron Pilot. General tactical currency was not broadly deficient: Demanding Mission, AAR, SFO, HUD-Out Approach, Formation Approach, ACBT, ACT, and Weapon Delivery events were shown as current.

Task-specific preparation for this profile was deficient:

• The SP had not received the Night Phase Briefing.
• The SP had not completed the NTR event.
• NVD LOWAT showed no completion date, no events in the preceding 365 days, and an overdue status.
• Low Altitude A/G was 94 days overdue; the last recorded event was 22 Jan 2026.
• The SP described the target/NVD task as unfamiliar.

The tracker displayed Night Sortie as current, with a last date of 25 Jul 2026 and three events in the preceding 365 days against a requirement of four. Because the recorded last date is the mishap date, the post-sortie record does not independently establish the SP’s night-sortie status before takeoff. In any event, general night recency did not substitute for the uncompleted Night Phase, NTR, and NVD LOWAT requirements.

Precision Approach was 55 days overdue, Low Altitude A/A had no recorded event. These items were not relevant to the mishap sequence.

9. Medical​

No medical, physiological, toxicological, crew-rest, or lifestyle information was presented to the Board. No evidence supports a medical factor. Although the SP described a complete loss of situational awareness, the available evidence is insufficient to diagnose spatial disorientation; the event is more directly supported as task saturation with breakdown of altitude/terrain cross-check.

10. Operations and Supervision​

Operations​

The sortie combined night/NVD operations, low-altitude navigation, a pop-up/terminal surface attack, targeting-pod employment, and a live SAM threat. These were demanding, interdependent tasks. The SP entered the target sequence without sensor contact on the DMPI and without the task-specific night/NVD preparation or low-altitude currency appropriate to the profile.

Supervision and Authorization​

The non-formal character of the sortie did not remove the requirement to match mission demands to pilot qualification, training, currency, and proficiency. The SP was permitted to participate in a night NVD/LOWAT A/G profile despite not having completed the Night Phase Briefing, NTR, or a recorded NVD LOWAT event, and while Low Altitude A/G currency was overdue.

Following the connection interruption, the flight did not establish an effective rejoin, hold, reset, or abort gate before the MA continued independently into the tactical route and threat area. A nominal four-ship therefore became a three-ship plus an unsupported single aircraft. The MA’s minimum separation from the rest of the flight was 25.6 NM. This removed normal mutual support and prevented timely cross-monitoring or intervention by flight leadership as the SP became tumbleweed and task saturated.

No radio recording or mission brief was available; the Board therefore cannot determine the exact instructions given by the flight lead. Nevertheless, telemetry establishes that no effective team-level control restored formation integrity before target-area commitment.

11. Human Factors (DoD HFACS 8.0)​

AE105 – Breakdown in Visual Scan or Instrument Cross-check. The SP did not maintain an effective attitude, altitude, vertical-velocity, and terrain cross-check during the terminal maneuver and did not arrest a descent exceeding 30,000 feet per minute.

AE202 – Ineffective Task Prioritization. Target acquisition, NVD troubleshooting/removal, and threat reaction displaced the primary requirement to aviate and maintain terrain clearance. TheSP continued the target sequence rather than aborting, climbing to a safe altitude, and rebuilding situational awareness.

PC103 – Task Saturation. The SP’s available mental resources were exceeded by task unfamiliarity, target-search failure, NVD/display integration, high-speed terminal maneuvering, the SA-6 engagement, and independent operation without immediate flight support.

PT101 – Untrained Operator. The SP had not completed the Night Phase Briefing, NTR, or any recorded NVD LOWAT event for the task being performed.

PT103 – Lack of Currency. The SP’s Low Altitude A/G event was 94 days overdue. This reduced recent task familiarity and margin during a night low-altitude/pop-up attack.

PP101 – Ineffective Team Resource Management. After the connection interruption, the flight did not restore and maintain an accurate shared picture or formation integrity. The -2 proceeded into the tactical route at least 25.6 NM from the remainder of the flight.

PP111 – Task/Mission-In-Progress Re-Planning. The flight did not effectively revise the plan after the connection interruption and prolonged separation. The SP also did not reset or abort after becoming tumbleweed and experiencing NVD/targeting difficulty.

SI008 – Tasked Individual with Lack of Experience, Currency, or Proficiency. The mission profile placed an SP without completed night/NVD prerequisites and with overdue Low Altitude A/G currency into a demanding night LOWAT surface-attack task.

12. Governing Directives and Publications (Selected)​

AFI 51-307, Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations; DAFI 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports; DAFMAN 91-223, Aviation Safety Investigations and Reports; DoD HFACS Version 8.0; applicable 455th vAEW F-16 training, night/NVD, qualification, and currency guidance; and applicable F-16 flight, NVD, low-altitude, and ground-collision-avoidance procedures as adapted for DCS.

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Statement of Opinion​

1. Opinion Summary​

By a preponderance of the evidence, the MA was destroyed by controlled flight into terrain during a night surface-attack sequence at T75.47. The SP entered the terminal attack without sensor contact on the DMPI, changed NVD configuration while attempting to acquire the target, and continued a rapidly steepening nose-low maneuver while task saturated and separated from the remainder of the flight.

The MA began descending approximately 24.6 seconds before impact and approximately 18 seconds before the first recorded SA-6 missile launch. At the first launch, the MA was already approximately 29.7 degrees nose-low, descending at approximately 30,800 feet per minute, and only about 3,500 feet above target-area elevation. Neither missile struck the MA. The SA-6 engagement increased workload and aggravated an already hazardous flightpath, but it did not initiate the terminal descent and was not the direct cause of aircraft loss.

The MA impacted at 11:24:04, aligned with the planned target time and approximately 0.13 NM from listed DMPI J7547X5. The impact geometry, timing, lack of weapon release, and absence of a recovery trend are consistent with target/task channelization and loss of altitude/terrain situational awareness.

2. Cause​

The cause of the mishap was the SP’s breakdown in flight-instrument, altitude, vertical-velocity, and terrain cross-check during a steep nose-low terminal maneuver, followed by failure to arrest the descent, resulting in controlled flight into terrain.

3. Substantially Contributing Factors​

PC103 / AE202 – Task Saturation and Ineffective Task Prioritization. The combined demands of failed sensor acquisition, NVD/display difficulty, NVD removal, terminal attack maneuvering, and SA-6 defense exceeded the SP’s capacity and displaced terrain clearance as the controlling priority.

PT101 / PT103 – Task-Specific Training and Currency Deficiencies. The SP had not completed the Night Phase Briefing, NTR, or NVD LOWAT and was 94 days overdue for Low Altitude A/G.

PP101 / PP111 – Loss of Flight Integrity and Ineffective Re-Planning. Following the connection interruption, the MA proceeded independently into the tactical route and threat area without rejoining. The remainder of the flight was never closer than 25.6 NM, eliminating normal mutual support and cross-monitoring.

SI008 – Profile Authorization Beyond Demonstrated Preparation. A non-formal sortie placed an SP without the applicable night/NVD prerequisites and low-altitude currency into a demanding LOWAT surface-attack profile.

SA-6 Engagement. The recorded launches did not damage the MA but added an immediate defensive demand during the final 6.6 seconds, aggravating task saturation and the unrecovered nose-low flightpath.

4. Conclusion​

The mishap was preventable. A safe outcome remained available through any of several earlier decisions: restricting the SP to a profile consistent with completed training and currency; holding or aborting after the connection interruption until formation integrity was restored; aborting the attack upon reaching the terminal phase without sensor contact; stabilizing at a safe altitude before changing NVD configuration; or immediately prioritizing a terrain-avoidance recovery over target prosecution and defensive maneuvering.

5. Safety Recommendations​

1. Enforce night/NVD qualification gates.
   • Require completion of the Night Phase Briefing, NTR, and NVD LOWAT before participation in night tactical LOWAT or terminal A/G events.
   • Treat expired Low Altitude A/G currency as disqualifying for a night low-altitude A/G profile unless the event is a formally supervised requalification sortie.
   • Apply the same gates to non-formal and continuation-training flights.
2. Establish a disconnect and formation-integrity rule.
   • Brief a rejoin, hold, reset, or abort plan for a delayed flight member.
   • Do not permit a separated wingman to continue single-ship into a tactical target or SAM threat area unless the mission is specifically planned and authorized for single-ship execution.
   • Require flight lead to confirm formation/PPLI integrity and readiness before target-area commitment.
3. Standardize terminal-attack abort criteria.
   • “Tumbleweed” or no sensor contact at the final attack gate, inability to correctly integrate NVDs with cockpit displays, or loss of altitude/terrain situational awareness should drive an immediate abort, climb/stabilization at the briefed safe altitude, and deliberate rebuild of situational awareness.
   • A SAM launch during a degraded visual or sensor state should not be combined with continued target prosecution.
4. Train the combined failure case.
   • Add a night simulator/mission scenario combining failed DMPI acquisition, NVD/display-management difficulty, a SAM engagement, and an abort/recovery requirement.
   • Grade aviate–navigate–communicate priorities, terrain/altitude cross-check, timely attack-abort decisions, and flight-lead intervention.
5. Preserve pre-sortie currency state.
   • Ensure post-sortie event logging does not obscure whether a pilot was current before takeoff. Qualification reviews and AIB exports should show the pilot’s status as of step time.