455 vAIR EXPEDITIONARY WING
vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report
Mishap Aircraft (MA): F-16CM, S/N 96-090
Unit: 8th vFS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: RAZOR1 flight (3-ship); MA was RAZOR12 (-2)
Mishap Date: 03 Jan 2026 (telemetry Zulu; mission span crossed midnight)
Airspace: NTTR / enroute recovery; bailout in Sally Corridor
Mission: Continuation training (planned 2-ship BFM; expanded to 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA)
Crew: Upgrading Pilot (UP) – ejected, injured; recovered
Other Aircraft: RAZOR11 (-1) and RAZOR13 (-3) (non-mishap)
Damage: Aircraft destroyed (post-ejection impact)
1. Authority and Purpose
This vAIB short form is organized consistent with USAF practice under AFI 51-307 and the format exemplified in public F-16 AIBs (Authority/Purpose; Sequence of Events; Maintenance; Systems; Weather; Crew Qualifications; Medical; Operations & Supervision; Human Factors; Governing Directives; Statement of Opinion). The purpose of the report is for entertainment and learning only in DCS.
2. Accident Summary
Following aerial refueling, the MA failed to return the air refueling system to a normal configuration and/or failed to achieve slipway door closure. With the AR configuration remaining active (AR indication visible), external tanks were depressurized and external fuel transfer was inhibited, resulting in trapped external fuel.
Despite persistent cockpit cues (AR indication, flashing HUD FUEL, and later TRP FUEL), the UP continued the profile and attempted to manage the problem largely via bingo adjustments rather than correcting the causal configuration error and/or knocking it off to troubleshoot. Reservoir fuel level warnings (AFT FUEL LOW then FWD FUEL LOW) followed as fuselage/reservoir fuel was consumed normally while external fuel remained unusable. The engine flamed out, the EPU activated, and the UP ejected. The MA impacted terrain unmanned. Approximately 3,000 lb remained in the external wing tanks (2×370) at the time of fuel starvation.
Unit/Aircraft: F-16CM assigned to 8 vFS, 455 vAEW.
Sortie type: Continuation training. Per UP interview, the sortie was initially planned as a 2-ship BFM event but expanded in execution into a 3-ship event including AAR, followed by demanding low altitude tactical navigation (LATN) and basic surface attack (BSA). The UP reported feeling rusty and rushed throughout.
Track/telemetry source: Tacview ACMI provided; Analysis of .trk file and video.
a. Mission. Training sortie (BFM → AAR → LATN → BSA). External wing tanks installed (2×370).
b. Planning. Planned 2-ship BFM per UP; expanded to 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA during execution (increased workload/pace).
c. Preflight. No discrepancies presented to AIB (short-form).
d. Summary of Accident (key indications/timeline).
e. Impact. Post-ejection, unmanned MA descended to ground impact (uninhabited terrain).
f. Egress and AFE. UP initiated ejection following flameout and altitude/energy depletion; ACES II performance nominal.
g. SAR (per flight/SAR report).
Forms/Inspections/Procedures/Supervision/Fluids/Unscheduled: Reviewed (short-form); no evidence of maintenance causal factors (engine, hydraulics, electrical) presented to AIB. Event sequence is consistent with fuel starvation due to inhibited external transfer rather than mechanical fuel quantity loss.
(1) CSFDR/Telemetry (Tacview). Telemetry establishes:
(2) Fuel / AR system interaction (core mechanism).
(3) Pilot action/indications (symptom vs cause).
VMC. Weather not a factor.
UP: First sortie in ~365 days (per report). Previously IQT/MQT qualified in a prior unit; grandfathered into MQ training in the 561st.
UP interview (post-mishap): The UP stated he felt rusty and rushed. The sortie expanded from 2-ship BFM to a 3-ship with AAR followed by demanding LATN and BSA. The UP cited channelized attention and complacency as driving factors in disregarding warnings/indications. The UP assessed the proper action would have been to knock it off (KIO) at the first indication of a fuel issue and work the problem deliberately.
UP sustained a significant left leg fracture with arterial bleeding; tourniquet applied; patient conscious and stabilized; recovered to Nellis for medical transfer. No additional factors (crew rest/toxicology) were presented to AIB (short-form).
Operations. Continuation training in NTTR with formation profile complexity increasing during execution (2-ship BFM → 3-ship AAR → LATN → BSA).
Supervision/Authorization. The expanded profile increased workload and compressed opportunities for deliberate cross-checks and abnormal-response discipline. Flight cross-monitoring did not prevent continued mission execution despite persistent AR/fuel cues. A high-value divert opportunity existed after the first reservoir warning: at the time corresponding to AFT FUEL LOW, the MA was ~2.9 NM from Creech yet an immediate divert/landing plan was not executed.
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency (Individual): UP reported rust (first sortie in ~365 days), increasing susceptibility to switchology errors and delayed diagnosis under workload.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Complacency: UP reported channelized attention and complacency led to disregarding persistent AR/fuel cues; responses emphasized managing indications (bingo changes) rather than correcting the causal configuration and stabilizing to troubleshoot.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / KIO Discipline: Failure to positively verify post-AR configuration (AIR REFUEL to CLOSE / slipway door closed / AR indications extinguished) and failure to KIO at first credible fuel-system abnormality.
OP004 – Mission Creep / Workload Management (Ops/Supervision): Sortie expanded in-flight from planned 2-ship BFM into 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA, increasing workload and reducing margin for error recognition and correction; cross-monitoring/intervention was insufficient.
By a preponderance of the evidence, the MA experienced fuel starvation due to inhibited external fuel transfer following aerial refueling, consistent with the AR configuration remaining active (slipway door not closed and/or AIR REFUEL not returned to CLOSE). The UP continued the sortie despite persistent cues (AR indication, HUD FUEL, and TRP FUEL), resulting in progressive depletion of fuselage/reservoir fuel, reservoir low cautions, and eventual flameout with significant external fuel remaining trapped. Ejection occurred at 00:27:37.890Z approximately 36.8 NM north of Nellis in the Sally Corridor.
Loss of aircraft following engine flameout from reservoir fuel starvation caused by external fuel transfer inhibition due to failure to return the AR system/slipway door to normal (CLOSE) after refueling, resulting in trapped external fuel.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / KIO Discipline: Failure to positively verify post-AR configuration and to KIO/troubleshoot at first fuel abnormal indications.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Complacency: Disregard of persistent warnings/indications and symptom-management via bingo changes rather than causal correction and recovery planning.
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency: First sortie in ~365 days increased vulnerability to rushed execution, missed cues, and delayed troubleshooting.
OP004 – Mission Creep / Workload Management: Profile expansion increased workload and reduced margin for disciplined cross-checking and assertive flight intervention; missed immediate divert opportunity near Creech after AFT FUEL LOW.
The mishap sequence was preventable with timely post-AR configuration verification, immediate KIO and troubleshooting upon persistent AR/fuel indications, and/or immediate divert/landing once reservoir cautions occurred, particularly given proximity to Creech at the first reservoir warning.
Reinforce existing Dash-1 emergency procedures through training and evaluation emphasis.
vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report
Mishap Aircraft (MA): F-16CM, S/N 96-090
Unit: 8th vFS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: RAZOR1 flight (3-ship); MA was RAZOR12 (-2)
Mishap Date: 03 Jan 2026 (telemetry Zulu; mission span crossed midnight)
Airspace: NTTR / enroute recovery; bailout in Sally Corridor
Mission: Continuation training (planned 2-ship BFM; expanded to 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA)
Crew: Upgrading Pilot (UP) – ejected, injured; recovered
Other Aircraft: RAZOR11 (-1) and RAZOR13 (-3) (non-mishap)
Damage: Aircraft destroyed (post-ejection impact)
1. Authority and Purpose
This vAIB short form is organized consistent with USAF practice under AFI 51-307 and the format exemplified in public F-16 AIBs (Authority/Purpose; Sequence of Events; Maintenance; Systems; Weather; Crew Qualifications; Medical; Operations & Supervision; Human Factors; Governing Directives; Statement of Opinion). The purpose of the report is for entertainment and learning only in DCS.
2. Accident Summary
Following aerial refueling, the MA failed to return the air refueling system to a normal configuration and/or failed to achieve slipway door closure. With the AR configuration remaining active (AR indication visible), external tanks were depressurized and external fuel transfer was inhibited, resulting in trapped external fuel.
Despite persistent cockpit cues (AR indication, flashing HUD FUEL, and later TRP FUEL), the UP continued the profile and attempted to manage the problem largely via bingo adjustments rather than correcting the causal configuration error and/or knocking it off to troubleshoot. Reservoir fuel level warnings (AFT FUEL LOW then FWD FUEL LOW) followed as fuselage/reservoir fuel was consumed normally while external fuel remained unusable. The engine flamed out, the EPU activated, and the UP ejected. The MA impacted terrain unmanned. Approximately 3,000 lb remained in the external wing tanks (2×370) at the time of fuel starvation.
3. Background
Unit/Aircraft: F-16CM assigned to 8 vFS, 455 vAEW.
Sortie type: Continuation training. Per UP interview, the sortie was initially planned as a 2-ship BFM event but expanded in execution into a 3-ship event including AAR, followed by demanding low altitude tactical navigation (LATN) and basic surface attack (BSA). The UP reported feeling rusty and rushed throughout.
Track/telemetry source: Tacview ACMI provided; Analysis of .trk file and video.
4. Sequence of Events (telemetry unless noted; Zulu times)
a. Mission. Training sortie (BFM → AAR → LATN → BSA). External wing tanks installed (2×370).
b. Planning. Planned 2-ship BFM per UP; expanded to 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA during execution (increased workload/pace).
c. Preflight. No discrepancies presented to AIB (short-form).
d. Summary of Accident (key indications/timeline).
- ~23:18Z: Aerial refueling occurred (per debrief). Post-AR, the MA did not return fully to normal configuration; AR indication remained visible.
- Fuel imbalance noted (per cockpit observation): FR/AL needles 23 / 29, totalizer 8.1 (includes external). HUD FUEL flashed for the duration (per report).
- 23:49Z: Bingo adjusted 2.0 → 4.0 (UP awareness); FR/AL 17 / 25, totalizer 7.4. AR indication remained visible.
- 23:51Z: Bingo adjusted again; FR/AL 15 / 22, totalizer 6.9; bingo set 5.5.
- 23:56:10Z: TRP FUEL displayed (trapped external fuel condition). At this point the MA continued to show usable-fuel risk despite totalizer fuel remaining. (Telemetry position approx 37.3290N, 116.1408W, ~8,400 ft MSL.)
- 00:15:39.920Z: Master caution AFT FUEL LOW (≤250 lb in aft reservoir). Bingo then set 2.5. Telemetry position approx 36.5881N, 115.6138W, ~12,160 ft MSL, ~2.9 NM from Creech AFB (INS).
- 00:19:50Z: Master caution FWD FUEL LOW (≤400–500 lb in forward reservoir). Totalizer reported ~3.4 (per cockpit observation).
- 00:24:30Z: Flameout and EPU activation (per report).
- 00:27:37.890Z: Ejection. Telemetry position approx 36.8441N, 114.9435W, ~5,170 ft MSL, approximately 36.8 NM from Nellis AFB (north) in the Sally Corridor.
- 00:28:04.450Z: Impact (unmanned MA) ~26.6 s post-ejection (telemetry last MA updates cease immediately after).
e. Impact. Post-ejection, unmanned MA descended to ground impact (uninhabited terrain).
f. Egress and AFE. UP initiated ejection following flameout and altitude/energy depletion; ACES II performance nominal.
g. SAR (per flight/SAR report).
- HH-60 dispatched from Nellis: JOLLY1 single ship.
- Takeoff: 0158L; on-scene: 0216L; signal flare spotted 0218L.
- PJs deployed; patient onload 0220L.
- KLSV recovery: 0239L with medical services on standby.
- Patient status: left leg fracture with arterial bleeding; tourniquet applied; conscious and stable.
- Timing overview (per flight): RAZOR12 ejected ~00:28L; RAZOR11/13 recovered ~00:47L; flight debriefed until ~01:45L; JOLLY1 airborne 0158L; patient at Nellis 0239L (~2h10m from ejection to Nellis).
5. Maintenance
Forms/Inspections/Procedures/Supervision/Fluids/Unscheduled: Reviewed (short-form); no evidence of maintenance causal factors (engine, hydraulics, electrical) presented to AIB. Event sequence is consistent with fuel starvation due to inhibited external transfer rather than mechanical fuel quantity loss.
6. Airframe/Systems (salient to event)
(1) CSFDR/Telemetry (Tacview). Telemetry establishes:
- Ejection at 00:27:37.890Z; position ~36.8441N, 114.9435W; ~5,170 ft MSL.
- AFT FUEL LOW timing point (per cockpit report) aligns with aircraft being ~2.9 NM from Creech at 00:15:39.920Z, ~12,160 ft MSL.
- Impact at 00:28:04.450Z (updates cease; unmanned impact).
(2) Fuel / AR system interaction (core mechanism).
- With the AIR REFUEL switch in OPEN and/or slipway door not closed, the fuel system enters an AR configuration that reduces internal tank pressurization, depressurizes external tanks, and prevents external fuel transfer. External wing tank transfer relies on tank pressurization; loss/inhibition of pressurization can leave external fuel trapped while fuselage/reservoir fuel continues to be consumed.
- The persistent AR indication and later TRP FUEL were consistent with an inhibited-transfer/trapped-fuel condition.
- Operational consequence: Totalizer fuel can appear adequate while usable fuselage/reservoir fuel is critically low, culminating in reservoir low cautions and eventual flameout with significant fuel still onboard externally ( ~3,000 lb trapped).
(3) Pilot action/indications (symptom vs cause).
- The UP adjusted bingo multiple times (2.0 → 4.0 → 5.5 → 2.5), indicating awareness of abnormal fuel indications; however, the causal configuration (AR mode/door) was not corrected and the profile was not promptly terminated to troubleshoot.
7. Weather
VMC. Weather not a factor.
8. Crew Qualifications
UP: First sortie in ~365 days (per report). Previously IQT/MQT qualified in a prior unit; grandfathered into MQ training in the 561st.
UP interview (post-mishap): The UP stated he felt rusty and rushed. The sortie expanded from 2-ship BFM to a 3-ship with AAR followed by demanding LATN and BSA. The UP cited channelized attention and complacency as driving factors in disregarding warnings/indications. The UP assessed the proper action would have been to knock it off (KIO) at the first indication of a fuel issue and work the problem deliberately.
9. Medical
UP sustained a significant left leg fracture with arterial bleeding; tourniquet applied; patient conscious and stabilized; recovered to Nellis for medical transfer. No additional factors (crew rest/toxicology) were presented to AIB (short-form).
10. Operations and Supervision
Operations. Continuation training in NTTR with formation profile complexity increasing during execution (2-ship BFM → 3-ship AAR → LATN → BSA).
Supervision/Authorization. The expanded profile increased workload and compressed opportunities for deliberate cross-checks and abnormal-response discipline. Flight cross-monitoring did not prevent continued mission execution despite persistent AR/fuel cues. A high-value divert opportunity existed after the first reservoir warning: at the time corresponding to AFT FUEL LOW, the MA was ~2.9 NM from Creech yet an immediate divert/landing plan was not executed.
11. Human Factors (HFACS)
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency (Individual): UP reported rust (first sortie in ~365 days), increasing susceptibility to switchology errors and delayed diagnosis under workload.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Complacency: UP reported channelized attention and complacency led to disregarding persistent AR/fuel cues; responses emphasized managing indications (bingo changes) rather than correcting the causal configuration and stabilizing to troubleshoot.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / KIO Discipline: Failure to positively verify post-AR configuration (AIR REFUEL to CLOSE / slipway door closed / AR indications extinguished) and failure to KIO at first credible fuel-system abnormality.
OP004 – Mission Creep / Workload Management (Ops/Supervision): Sortie expanded in-flight from planned 2-ship BFM into 3-ship AAR + LATN + BSA, increasing workload and reducing margin for error recognition and correction; cross-monitoring/intervention was insufficient.
12. Governing Directives and Publications (selected)
AFI 51-307 (Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations); DAFI 91-204; applicable F-16 fuel system / AR system concepts (Dash-1/-34 level) as adapted for DCS training.Statement of Opinion
1. Opinion Summary
By a preponderance of the evidence, the MA experienced fuel starvation due to inhibited external fuel transfer following aerial refueling, consistent with the AR configuration remaining active (slipway door not closed and/or AIR REFUEL not returned to CLOSE). The UP continued the sortie despite persistent cues (AR indication, HUD FUEL, and TRP FUEL), resulting in progressive depletion of fuselage/reservoir fuel, reservoir low cautions, and eventual flameout with significant external fuel remaining trapped. Ejection occurred at 00:27:37.890Z approximately 36.8 NM north of Nellis in the Sally Corridor.
2. Cause
Loss of aircraft following engine flameout from reservoir fuel starvation caused by external fuel transfer inhibition due to failure to return the AR system/slipway door to normal (CLOSE) after refueling, resulting in trapped external fuel.
3. Substantially Contributing Factors
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / KIO Discipline: Failure to positively verify post-AR configuration and to KIO/troubleshoot at first fuel abnormal indications.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Complacency: Disregard of persistent warnings/indications and symptom-management via bingo changes rather than causal correction and recovery planning.
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency: First sortie in ~365 days increased vulnerability to rushed execution, missed cues, and delayed troubleshooting.
OP004 – Mission Creep / Workload Management: Profile expansion increased workload and reduced margin for disciplined cross-checking and assertive flight intervention; missed immediate divert opportunity near Creech after AFT FUEL LOW.
4. Conclusion
The mishap sequence was preventable with timely post-AR configuration verification, immediate KIO and troubleshooting upon persistent AR/fuel indications, and/or immediate divert/landing once reservoir cautions occurred, particularly given proximity to Creech at the first reservoir warning.
5. Safety Recommendations
Reinforce existing Dash-1 emergency procedures through training and evaluation emphasis.
- Incorporate a post-AAR slipway-door/transfer-inhibited scenario (persistent AR indication, TRP FUEL, and subsequent reservoir cautions) into academic review and simulator/mission training to ensure aircrew can rapidly recognize the condition, execute the Fuel Low / Trapped External Fuel / Fuel Imbalance checklists correctly, and make a timely divert/land-as-soon-as-possible decision when reservoir cautions occur.
- Direct flight leads to include a post-AAR configuration cross-check as a briefed item and to enforce formation cross-monitoring to reduce delayed recognition and plan-continuation bias.
