455 vAIR EXPEDITIONARY WING
vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report
Mishap Aircraft (MA): HH-60G, S/N 89-26208
Unit: 66th vRQS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: JOLLY 11
Mishap Date: 07 Jan 2026 (telemetry Zulu)
Airspace: NTTR; vicinity Valley of Fire; north of Gass Peak
Mission: Search and Recovery Operations
Crew: Mission Pilot (recovered)
Other Aircraft: None
Damage: Loss of aircraft
Telemetry captured upset onset near 07:41:56Z and terminated at 07:42:00Z while descending at approximately -6,184 fpm with significant attitude instability. The sequence is consistent with loss of control in night IMC, compounded by navigation error, task saturation, and reduced terrain/escape margin.
Sortie type: Creeping line search (DUCK–VETTT, creeping SW, then reversing) (reported).
Track/telemetry source: Tacview ACMI provided; narrative timeline provided via chat timestamps.
Notes on time alignment: Narrative states KLSV departure at 0548Z; the Tacview segment for JOLLY 11 shows aircraft present at KLSV at ~06:29Z and liftoff at ~06:39:51Z. The vAIB retains narrative event times 0733Z–0742Z and treats departure timing as not fully reconcilable with the available telemetry segment.
b. Planning. Search pattern executed; later diverted toward perceived crash sites based on uncertain/incorrect navigation cues (reported).
c. Preflight. No discrepancies presented to AIB (short-form).
d. Summary of Accident (key indications/timeline).
f. Egress and AFE. Not provided.
g. SAR (per flight/SAR report). Not provided.
The mishap sequence is consistent with loss of control in night IMC during low-speed climb/ETL transition while operating in terrain-constrained conditions. The crew reported a known pitch/flight model anomaly associated with ETL transition; telemetry confirms the decisive upset occurred at low groundspeed in the same period, with rapidly diverging attitude and a high-rate descent.
(3) Pilot action/indications (symptom vs cause).
The crew recognized navigation uncertainty (precautionary landing to enter nav data) and experienced IMC encounters while maneuvering in mountainous terrain (narrative). Despite this, the sortie continued into conditions that reintroduced IMC and terrain risk. The decision to climb into cloud to clear terrain removed visual references and reduced recovery margin at the moment a control anomaly/handling sensitivity was reported.
Supervision/Authorization. Not provided. Cross-monitoring, abort gates, and explicit IMC/terrain decision points were not documented to the AIB. The precautionary landing after the first IMC/anomaly event represented a natural “reset” point where terminating or re-briefing with conservative IMC/terrain gates could have reduced recurrence risk.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Confirmation Bias: Focus on perceived crash-site cues and “expedite” behavior reduced systematic cross-checking of navigation validity and environmental risk.
DM201 – Decision Making / Plan Continuation Bias: Continued mission execution after an IMC/anomaly encounter and after acknowledging navigation uncertainty (landing to re-enter data), culminating in deliberate cloud entry for terrain crossing.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / Risk Gates: Absence or non-use of hard IMC/terrain clearance gates appropriate to a VFR search profile increased exposure to LOC-I/CFIT risk.
OP004 – Workload Management (Ops/Supervision context): Search task demands (visual scan + EFB/nav + terrain management) increased task saturation and reduced margin for controlled instrument transition and upset recovery.
CA101 – Channelized Attention / Confirmation Bias: Prioritized perceived crash-site cues and expedited routing over disciplined navigation validation and environmental risk management.
DM201 – Plan Continuation Bias: Continued the mission after an IMC/anomaly encounter and after acknowledging navigation uncertainty, leading to re-entry into IMC near terrain.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / Risk Gates: Lack of (or failure to apply) hard IMC/terrain clearance gates appropriate to a VFR search profile.
OP004 – Workload Management: High workload from search + navigation + terrain management reduced effective instrument transition and upset recovery capacity.
Standardize IMC/terrain gates (vRQS Stan/Eval): Codify “no intentional cloud entry for terrain crossing” for VFR search profiles; require explicit minimum terrain clearance altitudes and escape headings before operating near ridgelines, with additional margins for night IMC.
Recency risk control (455WG Safety): Incorporate recent sortie volume as a mission risk factor in ORM: if recent sorties are low, downgrade tasking complexity or add an additional control (supervision, wider terrain margins, simplified search plan, or mandatory reset points).
vAccident Investigation Board (AIB) Report
Mishap Aircraft (MA): HH-60G, S/N 89-26208
Unit: 66th vRQS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: JOLLY 11
Mishap Date: 07 Jan 2026 (telemetry Zulu)
Airspace: NTTR; vicinity Valley of Fire; north of Gass Peak
Mission: Search and Recovery Operations
Crew: Mission Pilot (recovered)
Other Aircraft: None
Damage: Loss of aircraft
1. Authority and Purpose
This vAIB short form is organized consistent with USAF practice under AFI 51-307 and the format exemplified in public AIBs (Authority/Purpose; Sequence of Events; Maintenance; Systems; Weather; Crew Qualifications; Medical; Operations & Supervision; Human Factors; Governing Directives; Statement of Opinion). The purpose of the report is for entertainment and learning only in DCS.2. Accident Summary
JOLLY 11 departed KLSV to conduct search and recovery operations between DUCK and VETTT. During the return portion of the search, JOLLY 11 deviated west due to a navigation error while maneuvering around mountainous terrain. The flight operated at night in IMC and repeatedly transitioned between terrain/ground contact and cloud while attempting to reach a perceived crash site. During a low-speed climb consistent with an ETL transition regime, a reported pitch/handling anomaly occurred and the aircraft entered a rapid upset with severe attitude excursions and an accelerating descent.Telemetry captured upset onset near 07:41:56Z and terminated at 07:42:00Z while descending at approximately -6,184 fpm with significant attitude instability. The sequence is consistent with loss of control in night IMC, compounded by navigation error, task saturation, and reduced terrain/escape margin.
3. Background
Unit/Aircraft: HH-60G assigned/operated by 66 vRQS, 455 vAEW (reported).Sortie type: Creeping line search (DUCK–VETTT, creeping SW, then reversing) (reported).
Track/telemetry source: Tacview ACMI provided; narrative timeline provided via chat timestamps.
Notes on time alignment: Narrative states KLSV departure at 0548Z; the Tacview segment for JOLLY 11 shows aircraft present at KLSV at ~06:29Z and liftoff at ~06:39:51Z. The vAIB retains narrative event times 0733Z–0742Z and treats departure timing as not fully reconcilable with the available telemetry segment.
4. Sequence of Events (telemetry unless noted; Zulu times)
a. Mission. Search and Recovery Operations between DUCK and VETTT; reverse back toward DUCK (reported).b. Planning. Search pattern executed; later diverted toward perceived crash sites based on uncertain/incorrect navigation cues (reported).
c. Preflight. No discrepancies presented to AIB (short-form).
d. Summary of Accident (key indications/timeline).
- 0548Z (narrative): JOLLY 11 departed KLSV.
- ~0553Z (narrative): DUCK reached; search commenced.
- 07:32:59.900Z (telemetry): Position: 36.46645N, 114.96136W; Alt: ~3,077 ft MSL; GS: ~129.6 kt; HDG: ~285° (westbound).
- 07:33Z (narrative): Numerous potential crash sites investigated; no findings. After reaching VETTT, aircraft reversed to “creep” back toward DUCK; navigation error drove westbound routing across KRYSS.
- 07:36:59.920Z (telemetry): Position: 36.48991N, 115.05542W; Alt: ~5,206 ft MSL; GS: ~5.3 kt; HDG: ~285° (very low-speed maneuvering consistent with terrain-constrained reposition).
- 07:37Z (narrative): Attempted climb over mountains; IMC encountered; recovery via climbing right-hand turn and controlled descent until ground in sight; precautionary landing to re-enter navigation data; relaunch toward incorrect site; IMC encountered again.
- 07:41:00.050Z (telemetry): Position: 36.48716N, 115.07083W; Alt: ~5,224 ft MSL; GS: ~12.5 kt; HDG: ~289°.
- 07:41Z (narrative): Low/slow flight with terrain intermittently in sight; elected to climb into clouds to cross terrain and descend into next valley (north of Gass Peak).
- 07:41:56.220Z (telemetry): Position: 36.48813N, 115.07567W; Alt: ~5,678 ft MSL; GS: ~26.1 kt; HDG: ~272°. (Upset onset marker)
- 07:41:57Z–07:41:59.640Z (telemetry): Severe attitude excursions (roll up to ~154°; pitch approx -59° to +62°) and increasing descent trend.
- 07:42:00Z (telemetry last state): Position: 36.48804N, 115.07582W; Alt: ~5,558 ft MSL; GS: ~18.2 kt; VSI: ~-6,184 fpm; roll: ~38°; pitch: ~50°. Telemetry terminates.
f. Egress and AFE. Not provided.
g. SAR (per flight/SAR report). Not provided.
5. Maintenance
Forms/Inspections/Procedures/Supervision/Fluids/Unscheduled: Reviewed (short-form); no evidence of maintenance causal factors presented to AIB.6. Airframe/Systems (salient to event)
(1) CSFDR/Telemetry (Tacview). Telemetry establishes:- Upset onset marker: 07:41:56.220Z at 36.48813N, 115.07567W, ~5,678 ft MSL, GS ~26.1 kt.
- Severe attitude excursions: ~07:41:57Z–07:41:59.640Z (roll to ~154°, pitch approx -59° to +62°).
- Last recorded state: 07:42:00Z at 36.48804N, 115.07582W, ~5,558 ft MSL, VSI ~-6,184 fpm, telemetry termination.
The mishap sequence is consistent with loss of control in night IMC during low-speed climb/ETL transition while operating in terrain-constrained conditions. The crew reported a known pitch/flight model anomaly associated with ETL transition; telemetry confirms the decisive upset occurred at low groundspeed in the same period, with rapidly diverging attitude and a high-rate descent.
(3) Pilot action/indications (symptom vs cause).
The crew recognized navigation uncertainty (precautionary landing to enter nav data) and experienced IMC encounters while maneuvering in mountainous terrain (narrative). Despite this, the sortie continued into conditions that reintroduced IMC and terrain risk. The decision to climb into cloud to clear terrain removed visual references and reduced recovery margin at the moment a control anomaly/handling sensitivity was reported.
7. Weather
Night IMC. Reported conditions were OVC030 with 5SM visibility. Observed/actual overcast base over KLSV was reported as approximately 800–900 ft AGL. Tacview does not encode IMC directly; therefore, weather assessment is based on the provided report. Weather was a factor by virtue of low ceiling, night conditions, and loss of outside visual reference during terrain-crossing maneuvers.8. Crew Qualifications
Pilot Currency (per squadron tracker):- Landing (Day): 2025-12-22 (Max 45 days) — CURRENT (18 events in last 365; 26 days until non-current)
- Night Sortie: 2026-01-07 (Max 180 days; 4 required) — CURRENT (7 events in last 365; 177 days until non-current)
- Flights (30d): 2
- Flights (90d): 2
- Flights (365d): 17
9. Medical
Not provided. (Crew recovery reported; injury status not provided to the AIB.)10. Operations and Supervision
Operations. Search mission execution deviated from the planned creeping line pattern due to navigation error and cue acceptance toward a perceived crash site, resulting in westbound terrain-committing routing and repeated IMC exposure during night operations.Supervision/Authorization. Not provided. Cross-monitoring, abort gates, and explicit IMC/terrain decision points were not documented to the AIB. The precautionary landing after the first IMC/anomaly event represented a natural “reset” point where terminating or re-briefing with conservative IMC/terrain gates could have reduced recurrence risk.
11. Human Factors (HFACS)
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency (Individual): Low recent sortie volume (2 sorties in last 30/90 days) may have reduced margin for rapid instrument transition, upset recognition, and recovery during time-compressed events.CA101 – Channelized Attention / Confirmation Bias: Focus on perceived crash-site cues and “expedite” behavior reduced systematic cross-checking of navigation validity and environmental risk.
DM201 – Decision Making / Plan Continuation Bias: Continued mission execution after an IMC/anomaly encounter and after acknowledging navigation uncertainty (landing to re-enter data), culminating in deliberate cloud entry for terrain crossing.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / Risk Gates: Absence or non-use of hard IMC/terrain clearance gates appropriate to a VFR search profile increased exposure to LOC-I/CFIT risk.
OP004 – Workload Management (Ops/Supervision context): Search task demands (visual scan + EFB/nav + terrain management) increased task saturation and reduced margin for controlled instrument transition and upset recovery.
12. Governing Directives and Publications (selected)
AFI 51-307; DAFI 91-204; applicable rotary-wing instrument/terrain risk concepts as adapted for DCS training and 455/vRQS SOPs (if published).Statement of Opinion
1. Opinion Summary
By a preponderance of the evidence, JOLLY 11 experienced loss of control during night IMC while operating low and slow in mountainous terrain after a navigation error diverted the aircraft from the intended creeping line search. The crew reported a pitch/handling anomaly during ETL transition; telemetry shows a decisive upset beginning near 07:41:56Z at low groundspeed with severe attitude excursions and an accelerating descent. Telemetry terminated at 07:42:00Z while descending at approximately -6,184 fpm, consistent with loss of aircraft following an unrecoverable upset. The mishap sequence was preventable through validated navigation cross-checks and enforcement of conservative night IMC/terrain decision gates (abort/RTB/reset) for search profiles.2. Cause
Loss of aircraft following an unrecoverable upset consistent with loss of control in night IMC during low-speed terrain-crossing maneuvers, initiated by navigation error and compounded by reduced visual reference and limited recovery margin.3. Substantially Contributing Factors
AE103 – Proficiency/Recency: Low recent sortie volume reduced performance margin during time-compressed night IMC/upset conditions.CA101 – Channelized Attention / Confirmation Bias: Prioritized perceived crash-site cues and expedited routing over disciplined navigation validation and environmental risk management.
DM201 – Plan Continuation Bias: Continued the mission after an IMC/anomaly encounter and after acknowledging navigation uncertainty, leading to re-entry into IMC near terrain.
PP201 – Procedural Compliance / Risk Gates: Lack of (or failure to apply) hard IMC/terrain clearance gates appropriate to a VFR search profile.
OP004 – Workload Management: High workload from search + navigation + terrain management reduced effective instrument transition and upset recovery capacity.
4. Conclusion
The mishap sequence was preventable with: (1) two-source navigation validation before deviating from the creeping line pattern, (2) a mandatory reset/terminate trigger after the first IMC encounter, and (3) prohibition of intentional cloud entry for terrain crossing absent defined instrument procedures, minimum safe altitude margins, and explicit night IMC escape procedures.5. Safety Recommendations
Instrument transition discipline (vRQS Training/Stan-Eval): Add a required training block emphasizing immediate actions for inadvertent IMC during terrain work at night: stabilize, climb to a pre-briefed safe altitude corridor, and abort/RTB or land-and-rebrief.Standardize IMC/terrain gates (vRQS Stan/Eval): Codify “no intentional cloud entry for terrain crossing” for VFR search profiles; require explicit minimum terrain clearance altitudes and escape headings before operating near ridgelines, with additional margins for night IMC.
Recency risk control (455WG Safety): Incorporate recent sortie volume as a mission risk factor in ORM: if recent sorties are low, downgrade tasking complexity or add an additional control (supervision, wider terrain margins, simplified search plan, or mandatory reset points).
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