455 vAIR EXPEDITIONARY WING
Mishap Aircraft (MA): F-16CM, S/N 96-081
Unit: 8th vFS, 455th vAEW
Flight Callsign: WOOL1
Mishap Date: 26 Oct 2025
Airspace: NTTR R-4806W
Mission: TR-2
Crew: Upgrading Pilot (UP) - ejected, uninjured
Damage: Aircraft destroyed (post-ejection impact)
This vAIB short form is organized consistent with USAF practice under AFI 51-307 and the format exemplified in public F-16 AIBs (Authority/Purpose; Sequence of Events; Maintenance; Systems; Weather; Crew Qualifications; Medical; Operations & Supervision; Human Factors; Governing Directives; Statement of Opinion). The purpose of the report is for entertainment and learning only in DCS.
During acrobatic training in R-4806W, the MA departed controlled flight from a very nose-high, negative G, and low-energy condition and entered an erect deep stall. Yaw developed during the stall. In this condition the yaw-rate limiter uses the horizontal tails for roll, reducing pitch authority; with a 300-gal centerline tank and wing stores this often requires multiple well-timed MPO (Manual Pitch Override) pitch-rock cycles to produce sufficient nose-down pitch rate for recovery. The UP attempted recovery but did not execute a correctly phased MPO sequence. As the aircraft approached 14,000 ft MSL, the IP advised altitude. At <10,000 ft MSL the UP ejected at 20:58:01Z; the MA impacted terrain about 22 seconds later. The deep stall was determined to be recoverable based on simulation replications with correct technique and prior training exposure.
Unit/Aircraft: F-16CM assigned to 8 vFS, 455 vAEW.
Sortie type: B-course TR-2 (second flown ride in Transition Phase). The B-course WST-5 simulator event (emergency procedures incl. out-of-control recoveries) was missed from the syllabus and internal instruction following the outcome of AIB F-16CM 96-087.
a. Mission. Training sortie emphasizing high pitch attitudes, AOA management, and recoveries (HARTS). Stores/fuel below.
b. Planning. Routine local training authorization under the B-course program
c. Preflight. No discrepancies presented to AIB; Code-1 release.
d. Summary of Accident.
• Pre-departure setup (mission/telemetry): 32,067 ft MSL, ~70° nose-high, ~92 KCAS.
• Departure (mission/telemetry): Deepstall conditions were fully developed within 18 seconds of departing controlled flight. The aircraft entered a ~18,000 FPM decent rate with pitch oscillations between ~40 and ~ negative 26 degrees. Yawing oscillations exceeded 90 degrees of heading.
• Ejection: 20:58:02Z, ~09,448 ft MSL
• Impact: 19:17:19.246Z (≈ 62 s post-ejection).
e. Impact. Post-ejection, unmanned MA descended to ground impact (uninhabited terrain).
f. Egress and AFE. UP initiated ejection upon IP direction; ACES II performance was nominal; no injury reported.
g. SAR. Range personnel from Creech AFB recovered the UP. The UP sustained no injuries and assisted in self rescue.
The stall behavior (oscillatory, yaw present, need for multiple MPO cycles when properly phased) matches F-16 test report deep-stall descriptions, particularly with centerline and wing-loaded configurations.
Forms/Inspections/Procedures/Supervision/Fluids/Unscheduled: Reviewed; Code-1, no open discrepancies; no evidence of maintenance causal factors (structure, engine, hydraulics, electrical) per short-form review, consistent with vAIB maintenance checklisting.
(1) CSFDR/Telemetry. Telemetry establishes 20:58:02Z ejection; ~09,448 ft MSL max pitch -22° (AoA and airspeed traces around ejection not available to AIB.)
(2) FLCS/DFLCC (Flight Controls). Behavior consistent with deep-stall neutral band (~50–60° AoA) where full nose-down stabilator produces negligible nose-down moment; MPO pitch-rock is required to create nose-down pitch rate through the neutral band. Proper cadence ≈ 3 seconds per half-cycle; do not confuse yaw/roll oscillations with pitch.
a. Forecast/Observed: Day VMC, Temp 21 °C, QNH 29.65 inHg, Clear, Vis ≥ 6 SM.
b. Winds: SFC 000/0 kt; 6,600 ft 190/18 kt; 26,000 ft 218/31 kt.
c. Space Environment: N/A.
d. Operations: Weather not a factor.
UP: IFF Track E graduate; 16.1 hrs F-16 (455th); 0 flights/30 days; last sortie 21 Sep 2025 (Training). Emergency Procedural Training checkout not completed prior to HARTS.
IP (REDACTED): 8 vFS IP, current/qualified; 2/30, 10/90, 46/365, 145.6 hrs with the 455th.
UP: qualified; no reported health, toxicology, crew rest, or lifestyle issues relevant to the mishap.
Operations. Sortie was a B-course TR-2 event.
Supervision/Authorization. Authorization for this sortie profile was implicit via the B-course design then in effect; WST-5 (Simulator: Emergency Procedures and Instrument Practice) was omitted from the syllabus prior to Transition Phase. WST-5 covers critical action procedures, emergency procedures, and out-of-control recoveries (upright and inverted), among other tasks. The omission is assessed as a programmatic deficiency creating inadequate training exposure for emergency out-of-control recoveries before HARTS execution.
AE103 - Training Deficiency (Individual): UP lacked hands-on high-AOA/MPO exposure; recovery requires muscle-memory timing and phasing under stress.
OP003 - Inadequate Training Program (Organizational): WST-5 omission removed simulator exposure to out-of-control recoveries prior to TR-1/HARTS.
PP102 - Inadequate Procedural Guidance/Publication (Program/Syllabus): Syllabus flow allowed HARTS execution without prior MPO deep-stall practice, contrary to long-standing high-AOA training best practices.
AFI 51-307 (Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations); DAFI 91-204; applicable F-16 Dash-1/-34 extracts.
By a preponderance of the evidence, the MA departed controlled flight into an erect deep stall during acrobatic maneuvering. The UP’s ineffective MPO recovery (timing/phasing) in a low-energy state and oscillation-prone configuration (CATM-120C on 1/9; AIM-9X on 2/8; 300-gal centerline) with yaw development prevented recovery. The IP failed to recognize and correct the UP following a hazardous acrobatic entry.
Loss of aircraft following departure from controlled flight into an erect deep stall with ineffective MPO recovery execution (timing/phasing) in a low-energy condition and yaw-excited, centerline-loaded configuration. The observed stall/yaw behavior and required MPO technique match the F16 test flight descriptions (MPO cadence ≈ 3 s per half-cycle; beware yaw-rate-limiter use of tails for roll, which reduces pitch authority and may require multiple cycles).
- OP003 - Inadequate Training Program / Authorization via syllabus design. WST-5 simulator (EPs incl. out-of-control recoveries) was omitted prior to TR-1/HARTS, denying the UP required exposure.
- AE103 - Training Deficiency (individual exposure). UP had not completed a emergency out of control recovery checkout; improper cadence/phasing under stress is a known pitfall without hands-on practice.
The deep stall was deemed to be recoverable with correct MPO technique and prior training exposure. The IP failure to recognize the hazardous conditions caused by incorrect acrobatic entry parameters is found to be substantially contributed to the mishap.
- Issue a Wing Safety Bulletin (WSB) to restore and protect currency.
- Immediate action: Publish a WSB directing all B-course and TX students to complete WST-5 prior to high-alpha/HARTS sorties; suspend HARTS until WST-5 sign-off is logged.
- Configuration-specific brief (standing item).
For 300-gal centerline + 1/9 & 2/8: brief yaw-rate limiter using tails for roll (reduced pitch authority), likely need for 2–4 cycles, and the requirement to come off MPO once the nose truly falls.
